Chapter 8

Waiting Out the Rush

On the Durability of Wealth in Kenya's Coastal Sex Economies

George Paul Meiu

"If you get a lot of money very fast," Jadini, a man in his mid-twenties, explained in Swahili, "your mind will change completely. You will have a shock [*utapata shok*]. You will lose everything and return to zero." It was 5 April 2011. I had joined Jadini on Bamburi Beach, north of Kenya's coastal city of Mombasa, where he sold souvenirs to tourists. To attract foreigners to his beach stand, he wore a colorful traditional outfit associated with the "warriors" (*moran*) of Samburu, his ethnic group in northern Kenya. For the last four years, Jadini had migrated to the coast to make money in tourism. On that day, he and I sat in the shade, at the entrance of a tourist resort. We had joined four other young Samburu men, an elderly man from the coastal Giriama ethnic group, and a woman of Kamba ethnic origin, all of whom were selling different artifacts—fabrics, sculptures, and beadwork—at the beach. Jadini began talking about "fast money"—so-called *pesa ya haraka* or "money of the rush"—that is, money obtained quickly without substantial work, or, as Kenyans put it, "without sweating" (*bila kutoa jasho*). He wanted to convince the Giriama elder that the "shock" of receiving a large amount of money makes one lose self-control and spend mindlessly. I often heard Kenyans describe such money as "easy come, easy go" (using the English phrase).

The tourist season had just ended. Business was slow. Traders said that, in recent years, it had become difficult to make money at the beach. Tourist arrivals in Kenya had declined significantly following the post-election violence of early 2008. On the day I was visiting Jadini at the beach, six leading Kenyan politicians were arriving at The Hague to face the International Criminal Court on accusations of instigating the violence. To break the monotony of the long hours spent at an otherwise empty beach, men asked each other for news from The Hague. But the 2008 postelection violence was not the only reason tourism had declined. Growing security threats associated with the expansion of the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization at the border with Somalia, some 300 miles from Mombasa's north coast, had also conspired, of late, to keep international arrivals down.[1] My interlocutors hoped that tourism would soon recover. "We are just waiting [*tunangoja tu*]," one man said. "What else is there to do?"

As they waited for the few tourists from the nearby hotels to come out to the beach, these men talked extensively about money. The Giriama elder was unconvinced by Jadini's point about fast money causing a shock. So Rob, a Samburu man in his late thirties, stood up from under the shade of his souvenir display table, ready to tell a story. He had been migrating to the coast for nearly twenty years and had extensive experience with tourists. Pacing excitedly on the sand, he described how, some years prior, one white woman had paid him KSh 90,000 (US$900) for a rather ordinary wood sculpture of a giraffe. "At that time, tourists were not so knowledgeable about the prices of African art," he said. He had quoted this absurdly high price jokingly, not expecting the tourist to pay. But she did. Rob recalled:

> She told me to walk with her to the Barclays Bank, nearby. She took out four [bank] cards and withdrew her daily limit on each. When she put all that money in my hand—I am not kidding you—I started to shake [*nilianza kutetemeka*]. I could not believe all that money. That very night I boarded a *matatu* [public minibus] to go back home to Maralal [in Samburu district, northern Kenya]. I was scared to lose the money here, on the coast.

Jadini nodded. He understood Rob's reaction. Having experienced the shock of obtaining too much money too quickly, he had done a sensible thing by returning to northern Kenya, where his money would have been invested in livestock and kinship relations. This was how Rob coped with the danger of losing self-control and squandering cash: he opted to quickly reinvest in morally legitimate forms of social value; before, that is, the money evaporated. Turning to the Giriama elder, Jadini explained: "Believe me, *mzee wangu* [my elder], you cannot avoid a shock if you get all that money. That's a must [*hii ni lazima*]. That's the truth now. In that shock, with all that money, you will finish it all up without even realizing it. You just see it's all gone."

The elder waved his hand dismissively. "I won't get a shock. Why would I get a shock? I would put the money nicely in the bank and you will never see me at the beach again. If you budget the money neatly, you have it for a long time." Banking, budgeting, and planning, the elder suggested, were rational ways of preserving money, assuring its durability, no matter the timing of its arrival or its quantity.

Seeing the elder's skepticism, Rob decided to tell another story.

"Let me tell you something, *mzee*," he said. "There was a time I had over one million [Kenyan] shillings in my account."

The elder now looked at Rob with surprise. That was a large amount of money that few ordinary Kenyans would ever have had at one time. Jadini and other friends had already told me that Rob had been a "millionaire." Like many other Samburu men, he had had intimate relationships with wealthy white women from Western European countries who had offered him large sums of money and expensive gifts. It was the first time, however, that I had heard Rob talk about his past himself. He continued: "Every time I would go to the ATM in Mombasa to withdraw money, I would first stop by the police station to hire an escort with a gun, for security. I'd pay him KSh 5,000 [US$50] and he'd go with me to the ATM." In a context in which most beach traders rarely made 5,000 shillings over the course of an entire month, Rob's ability to dispense this amount for personal security—however extravagant this may have seemed to his interlocutors—testified to the sheer magnitude of his wealth. During that time, Rob owned four *matatu* minibuses, which he employed in public transport, as well as a large villa in Mtwapa, a coastal town with some of the highest real estate values in the country.

"Now, I have nothing," Rob said. "It's all gone. And I am back at the beach."

"This money is the devil himself [*shetani mwenywe*]," Jadini concluded.

Shock. Rushed money. The devil himself. Rob's stories and Jadini's comments evoke the seductions of a speculative economy, its unpredictable yet miraculous possibilities of enrichment, its missed chances and uncertain triumphs. More and more poor Kenyans have migrated to the coast over the last few decades, hoping that, if they could be in the right place at the right time, they too would make money quicker than elsewhere. Though many people I spoke to blamed Rob's loss on his own wastefulness, his excessive drinking, and his partying, numerous others believed that the problem lay elsewhere: namely, in the nature of the rushed money. The elder disagreed with Jadini and Rob's understandings of this money. But, like everybody else, he also knew that young, good-looking Kenyan men and women in coastal towns had a distinct advantage in acquiring wealth through sex, long-term relationships, and marriages with foreigners or wealthy locals. During my research on the coast, I collected numerous stories people told about various men or women who had become wealthy after an elderly white tourist fell in love with them or began paying them regularly for sex. Such stories emphasized not only how speculation and seduction brought about instant riches, but also—quite importantly—how their protagonists became rich one day, only to become poor again the next. What was it that made telling such stories an enjoyable pastime as people waited for such transformative opportunities to occur—or, in Rob's case, to *re*occur?

Certainly, detailing instances of rapid transformations of fortune and carefully enumerating the wealth of the protagonists made such desirable possibilities real, experientially close, and palpable: it brought them more strongly into the everyday. Such stories were more than a pleasurable, if anxious, pastime. Those who told them also reflected on the ambivalent nature of wealth in the present, its dangers, and its seductions. They wondered how to handle fast money more efficiently; how to cope with the "shock" of obtaining too much too quickly; and how to participate in the otherwise uncertain rush of the coastal economies without losing one's self and one's money.

To track the implications of these questions ethnographically, I explore how the intersection of two contrasting temporal dispositions trouble attempts to produce value in Kenya's coastal sexual and tourist economies. The first such disposition is *the rush*. Coastal towns, like Mtwapa and the nearby resorts, are places of intense, albeit unpredictably shifting, flows of people, goods, and money. People migrate to such towns from all over the country, searching for different opportunities to make a livelihood; motorbikes and cars speeding in all directions attest to the rush of a space of intensified possibility (a bumper sticker on a passing truck announces "Total Confusion"); colorful commodities exchange hands quickly; large villa-type houses and apartment buildings emerge "overnight" only to be sold off, again and again; wealth materializes miraculously and often disappears as quickly as it arrived. The rush speaks of the visceral perception of a particular kind of global capital—one that, as James Ferguson (2007: 38) argues, is "*globe-hopping*, not *globe-covering*," "neatly skipping over most of what lies in between." This is capital that comes and goes, "shocking" those it touches too quickly, too suddenly, before moving on. But the rush also describes people's urge to place themselves strategically in the path of unpredictable capital and to do so urgently and efficiently.

The second disposition is that of *waiting*. When one is well situated in a space of intensified possibility, whether that be at the beach or in a bar where one can meet foreigners, for example, "each person must wait for their own luck," as people say—*kila mtu angojee bahati yake*. Amidst the town's incessant rush—mobility, flexibility, investments—waiting practices play a central role in everyday life. To anticipate and access flows of money and commodities, men and women arrive from across Kenya, hoping to tap into the flows of "globe-hopping capital" and redirect it toward other places, such as, for example, their rural homes. To do so, sex workers and "beach boys" wait for hours—or, during "off seasons," for weeks or months—to meet wealthy patrons at the beach, in bars, or by the swimming pools in resorts; motorcycle cab drivers wait at crossroads to be hailed by travelers (and sometimes sexual patrons); and poor men and women often wait by the gates or office doors of the wealthy and influential to ask for money or work.

In this chapter, I explore practices of value production that emerge out of this dialectic of waiting and rushing. I outline, first, different ways in which people imagine and perceive the wait and the rush in relation to one another. Then, I demonstrate how the contradictions between these two temporal orientations generate new practices of managing and storing wealth. More specifically, I focus on attempts to "wait out the rush," that is, to produce durable forms of money and wealth in spite of the "shock" of the rush, in spite of the devilish nature of new wealth or "the devil himself," to use Jadini's phrase. My interlocutors on the Kenyan coast typically employed various strategies to prevent the quick loss of money. Even if, as I show, these strategies do not always overcome the contradictions of rushed money, they reveal how the dialectics of waiting and rushing shapes possibilities of value production in contemporary sex economies. I thus argue that understanding waiting and rushing relationally is important for conceptualizing how people imagine and contest money and durability in the present.

The Seductions of Speculation

With massive shifts in the global production and circulation of capital, speculative financial pursuits replace manufacturing capital and market liberalization diminishes constraints on the open circulation of goods and labor across boundaries. In this context, investments and opportunities for money-making connect discrete areas of the globe, while leaving others untouched, but their durability is uncertain: no one can predict just how long they will last. This has prompted new forms of migration, speculation, and entrepreneurship, myriad ways in which the marginalized have sought to put themselves in the way of capital and redirect money, goods, and opportunities toward their own regions, projects, and futures. Because flows of capital can easily cease or change path, producing new geographies of exclusion and inclusion, people everywhere imagine livelihoods amidst uncertainty and unpredictability

(Weiss 2007). Highlighting the speculative nature of neoliberal capital, Jean and John L. Comaroff (2001: 5) dub it "casino capitalism," a mode in which "production appears to have been superseded, as the *fons et origo* of wealth, by less tangible ways of generating value." This new mode of capital resonates with the logics, practices, and risks of gambling. It may appear that "gambling . . . has changed moral valence and invaded everyday life across the world" (ibid.). Middle-class Kenyans, development workers, and political and religious leaders are often critical of "gambling" as a mode of generating income, thus occluding just how much their own social and economic livelihoods are shaped by gambling-like speculations (Schmidt 2019). How then might we understand strategies of overcoming the rush in relation to what people describe as the contrasting forces of patient budgeting versus risky gambling, quick money versus durable wealth, or distinct space-time configurations of saving versus wasting?

The historical transformations mentioned above have also affected the nature of wealth as such, its perceived rhythms and temporalities, giving rise to new moral dilemmas. As a category of discourse and wealth, "fast money" has become, if anything, more pronounced globally in this late capitalist context (Osburg 2013; Walsh 2003; Znoj 2004). Discourses about ill-gotten money are certainly not new in Africa. The growing commodification and oppressive extraction of land, crops, and cattle have, since the advent of colonialism, generated new conundrums of kinship, respectability, and reproduction in which money plays a central role (see Bohannan 1955; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Hutchinson 1996). In *Bitter Money*, Parker Shipton (1989: 9) shows that, among Luo in western Kenya, "How money was obtained determines how it is classed; and how it is classed determines how people think it should be used." Thus, for example, the sale of resources associated with ancestors (land), European commodity extraction (gold), and masculine authority (roosters), to name only a few, represent causes generative of "bitter money." In coastal Kenya, such money has also been associated with "devil worship," witchcraft, sorcery, and the employment of *jini* spirits, in ways that associate particular currencies with negative forms of social value (McIntosh 2009; Meiu 2017; Smith 2008). In *For Money and Elders*, Robert Blunt (2019) argues that, since the 1980s, in Kenya, money—like gerontocratic authority—has become a salient object of popular suspicion, its value uncertain, its presence always potentially deceptive, devilish.

Coastal economies of sex and tourism, growing since the 1980s, only amplified the ambiguous qualities of money. In 2011, a coastal resident wrote in the national newspaper *Daily Nation*: "Many of my school mates at Kikambala Primary dropped out to become beach boys. Most of them hoped to hook up with rich tourists to support them." Suggestively entitled "Life Is Not a Beach: Time to End the 'Easy Money' Vicious Circle," this article decries young people's desire for quick money without serious work: "This mindset," the article continues, "that people can get easy money from rich tourists on the beaches . . . has caused a vicious circle of poverty from which many people are unable to break" (Daily Nation 2011). Discourses about the dynamics, rhythms, and unpredictable temporalities of quick money are always also discourses about morality, durability, and social reproduction: they debate the changing meanings of "work," proper forms of storing wealth, and the appropriate relation between accumulation and the life course.

In a context in which school education, employment, and the ability to save money were called sharply into question, those enriched through speculative schemes stood out: they appeared as both symptoms and causes of a perverse economy. This is evident not only in everyday talk and public opinion columns in national media, but also in the political spectacle of the state. Consider how, in early October 2018, police chiefs in Nairobi invited journalists and the public to witness them setting ablaze over three hundred gambling machines confiscated from city businesses. According to *The Star*, regional security chief Kang'ethe Thuku explained that these machines "encourage idleness and lack of productivity among the youths" (The Star 2018). Soon thereafter, police and government administrators across the country followed suit, burning gaming machines in big bonfires. A national ban on gambling passed by the Betting Control and Licensing Board in 2018 only amplified this trend. "These lottery joints," police officer David Kabena explained, "are . . . the major cause for the high dropout rate of school-going children and teenage pregnancies." Hence, the political spectacle of the public destruction of gambling machines can be understood as a ritual of national purification—targeted at the spirit of speculation characteristic of casino capitalism. The conditions of intelligibility for this political spectacle can be found in middle-class sensibilities of respectable work and wealth. They can also be found in political leaders' desires to produce an image of the state as invested in the securitization of youths as a demographic, by protecting their time and activities from the temptations of quick money, idleness, and wastefulness.

In the persistent absence of employment, however, young men and women continue to participate in speculative pursuits. Some of them acknowledge that something is wrong, not always with how they themselves produce money, but rather with the money itself. It is in this wider context that I propose to understand the quest of young men and women in coastal sex economies to devise new ways to "trick," as it were, money's devilish spirit—new ways, that is, to make it last. A central feature of this historical moment is thus the question of *durability* in a time of chronic *temporariness* (Mbembe in Shipley 2010: 659–60): how to produce forms of value that are lasting despite a growing sense of provisionality. Yet, it is important to remember that the condition of temporariness is by no means temporally uniform. Its rhythms alternate according to shifting possibilities, investments, and circulations. Thus, my ethnographic material prompts me to ask how people produce value at the intersection of two sets of affective dispositions and subjective orientations: the wait and the rush.

Trying to tease out subjective orientations and affective dispositions emerging in the neoliberal context, anthropologists have paid extensive attention to the central implications of waiting—as a set of practices, dispositions, and modes of relationality and temporality—in new kinds of social and economic value. Often, at the forefront of waiting practices, one finds young men—and sometimes women (Hansen 2005)—who are unemployed and find themselves with an excess of time on their hands (Ralph 2008). For many of them, waiting can result in feelings of uselessness, hopelessness, boredom, and devaluation (e.g., Jeffrey 2010; Mains 2007; Masquelier 2005; O'Neill 2017). Time in excess is thus often perceived as devalued time—it is time that cannot be converted into the exchange value of "labor"—and thus can be "killed," "past," or "wasted." Even so, anthropologists have shown that time in excess can also produce new forms of value. Michael Ralph (2008: 17), for example, argues that "If we define value as a meaningful consequence of human activity, transformed into social relationships that structure a system of production, we might begin to deliberate at greater length about how youth [use various kinds of waiting practices]." Waiting practices generate new forms of intimacy and social capital that, if mobilized at the right moment, can be converted into cash (Newell 2012).

The temporalities of waiting are, nevertheless, relational: one can only understand oneself as waiting, being left behind, and bored in relation to others who speed up, move on, and progress (O'Neill 2017: 15–17). More attention needs to be paid then to the relationships between myriad forms of waiting, dwelling, and rushing, and their mutually constitutive implications. Rosalind C. Morris (2008) argues that, for many unemployed men and women in South Africa—who, like many others, are waiting around for opportunities—the rush has become a dominant dimension of their lived world: a rush to insure life and death against risk, a rush to achieve even minimal forms of dignity. If the rush has characterized South African economies at least since the rise of mining industries in the early twentieth century, in the present the rush of capital is more strongly tied to the temporalities generated by risk discourse: in particular, panics and the related haste to speculate on possibilities, security, and value. Drawing on Morris's work, I ask: how do people position themselves to anticipate the rush of capital? What do they do as they wait? How and when do they choose to rush themselves, to make the rush happen? And, if successful, how might one dwell in success—how might one "wait out the rush" and emerge from it with wealth? These are questions about the production of durability at the intersection of waiting and the rush.

Kenya's Coastal Sex Economies

The possibility of young men and women acquiring spectacular wealth by engaging in various forms of transactional sex is not new in Kenya. Luise White (1990) shows how, as early as World War I, in colonial Nairobi, women who engaged in transactional sex often amassed much more wealth than male labor migrants. This allowed them to invest in livestock, the bridewealth payments of their male kin and dependents, or the farms of their rural families. Later, such wealth also allowed women to become central players in Nairobi's housing market. As White argues, "full-time prostitution and women's use of their earnings . . . to establish themselves as household heads seem to have been widespread in Nairobi and coastal towns" (1990: 50). Since the 1920s, the international port economy of the coastal city of Mombasa attracted numerous labor migrants from across the country (Cooper 1987). The economic possibility of this labor economy also brought to town young women who engaged in various forms of transactional sex, whether as "prostitutes" or "temporary wives" (Gachuhi 1973). Similarly, young men on the coast engaged in sex-for-money exchanges with senior men or women who would become their intimate patrons (1973: 7). Gill Shepherd (1987: 251) notes that "While they are still young, homosexuals bask in their glory, boasting of their lovers and sometimes making a good deal of money." One gay man interviewed in the 1950s, Shepherd points out, "proudly showed . . . his Post Office Bank book with a credit balance of over 600 [pounds] in it, a huge sum at the time. Another owned at least 150 [pounds] worth of jewelry given him by admirers. The financially astute are able to buy a house and as they get older they can begin to live from renting rooms out" (251). Urban sexual economies have thus long sustained the possibility of enrichment, often expressed in real estate as an idiom of durability.

What has changed in the last quarter of the twentieth century is, in part, the scale and magnitude of the sexual economy. With the spectacular

Figure 8.1. The rush of life in Mtwapa, Kenya, 2017. © George Paul Meiu.

rise of tourism to Kenya, which began in the mid-1970s, migrants from across the country have moved—seasonally or for long periods of their lives—to the coast, seeking employment or informal sources of income in and around the port and beach resorts, with their nightlife (Mahoney 2017; Schoss 1995). This has also led to the proliferation of forms of intimate attachment (Kibicho 2009; Omondi 2003). Brothel and street sex workers, strippers and call-out escorts, beach boys and pimps, as well as male and female tourists, are some of the key social actors who form the vast networks of tourist-oriented sexual exchanges on the Kenyan coast. Men and women from Germany, Italy, England, the Netherlands, and the United States travel to Kenya seeking, among other things, cheaper sexual services, the realization of stereotypical fantasies with racial Others, adventures, and the anonymity of a foreign place. Whereas many tourists hire sex workers for one-time sexual encounters, many others engage in long-term relationships with locals, supporting them with money and gifts for longer periods of time (Kibicho 2009). African elites, both from Kenya and elsewhere on the continent, also joined the vast clientele of those engaged in transactional sex on the coast.

I began doing fieldwork on the Kenyan coast, in the town of Mtwapa, in 2008, when I joined Samburu men from northern Kenya on their seasonal trips to the coast. Mtwapa—a township of nearly 50,000 people (in 2009), north of Mombasa (see figure 8.1)—has become infamous, since the late 1980s, as a haven for all kinds of transactional sex. As, from the 1980s, retirees mostly from Germany, Switzerland, England, and Italy bought land and built houses in what had initially been a small set of Giriama villages, Mtwapa quickly turned into Kenya's infamous "sin city." Expatriates—known among residents as *Kenya Kimbo*, that is, "the cooking fat of Kenya" (Kimbo is a local brand of cooking fat)—fueled a large market of casinos, discos, nightclubs, and real estate. In 2008, a Kenyan journalist said that Mtwapa was a place of "unforgettable fun, sin and loads of cash" (Standard 2008). Animated by strippers, exotic dancers, streetwalking sex workers, gays and lesbians, and tourists, Mtwapa, he wrote, "comes to life, with sin that can put Sodom and Gomorrah to shame." By 2011, administrators of the Kilifi and Mombasa districts, at the borders of which the town is located, fought over its territorial incorporation, in no small part because of the revenues from the sex economy. The possibility of making money through transactional sex with foreigners but also wealthy Africans—whether through one-night stands, long-term relationships, or even marriages—attracted many young Kenyans to Mtwapa.

Men like Jadini and Rob (whom I introduced at the beginning of this chapter) migrated twice every year to tourist resorts, renting rooms in Mtwapa and selling artifacts and dancing for tourists in nearby beach resorts. Most of these men hoped to meet white women for one-night stands or long-term, long-distance relationships. Those who were successful built houses, bought cars, traveled to Europe, and established themselves as influential "big men" in the north (Meiu 2015; 2017). Since 2015, my research has shifted to exploring the livelihoods of women and gay men in sex work. Like my Samburu interlocutors previously, many of these men and women came to Mtwapa as migrants or migrant settlers from "upcountry" (*barani*). Others were "coastal people" (*wapwani*) from neighboring towns and villages. While, overall, relatively few became wealthy, the wealth and stories of the lucky few circulated widely and informed the desires of the many who continued to wait in and around Mtwapa for similar opportunities. More often than not, such wealth never materialized. Waiting for life-transforming opportunities, men and women talked at length about such wealth.

The Rush before the Crash: On Fast Money

"If you're lucky, here, it is easy to get rich fast," said Vivian, a 35-year-old woman, in 2017. She had lived in Mtwapa for the past seventeen years. Vivian, my research assistant Mary, and I were talking over cold sodas in a small street-side restaurant on Mtwapa's main road. We had met Vivian earlier that week, during a visit at a local NGO that supports women involved in sex work. Vivian, who identifies openly as a *dem ya rodi* (street lady) or *malaya* (prostitute), worked as a peer educator for this NGO. As we slowly sipped our drinks, Vivian talked to us about troubles with fast money. Like Rob, Vivian had also been wealthy in the past. "Life goes up and down here," she said. "When things go up, I too do well. When things go down, I struggle."

Vivian arrived on the coast from a village in western Kenya for the first time in 2000. She had dropped out of school and decided to move to Mtwapa, where her older sister was living with a white man. Upon arrival on the coast, she learned that her sister had recently moved to Europe. Vivian worked for one month as a housemaid, but because the work was hard and poorly paid, she quit her job and made friends with young women in sex work. Thus, as she put it, "I entered prostitution" (*niliingia umalaya*). A few years later, Vivian met an elderly white man from Switzerland. "I was beautiful at that time," she recalled. "I was not as big as I am now. I would dress smart and attract many clients." The Swiss man not only supported her financially but also decided to build her a house. "At that time," Vivian said, "I was living with friends in a small shack in a squatter area." Squatter land is land designated for temporary use by poor families; no permanent structures can be built on it. "The white man asked me: 'Is this your land?'" Vivian said. "I was so happy he was going to build me a house, so I said yes. He asked: 'Do you have a title deed?' I said yes." So, the man built her a spacious self-contained three-bedroom house. But soon after the house was finished, the city evicted Vivian and demolished the large concrete construction. When the Swiss man found out that Vivian had lied, he broke up with her. And so, Vivian concluded, "I returned to poverty" (*nilirudi kwa umaskini*).

When Vivian mentioned the area in which the Swiss man had built her a house, I recalled walking through an adjacent neighborhood in 2008. Some Samburu migrants had taken me there to show me the "cursed wealth" (*mali ya laana*) of Mtwapa. I remember looking in awe at large concrete villas—two- or three-story houses—all allegedly built by foreigners. The walls of many of these houses had large vertical cracks down the middle. A few had come crashing down. Most of them were no longer inhabited. I remember saying to my companions that perhaps landslides were responsible for the destruction. But, no, they reassured me, there was nothing wrong with the land. The houses cracked and began falling down because they were built with "money of sorcery" (*pesa ya uchawi*). Young Kenyan men and women had involved witch doctors (*waganga*) or even *jini* spirits in securing rich foreign partners and thus obtained money to build these structures. Vivian remembered those houses vividly. "The problem is that this money is cursed," she said. "It is hard to make it stay put. Even if you build with it, it won't last."

Concrete houses were important idioms not only of wealth but also of durability. Owning such houses, along with the land upon which they were built, was an important element of middle-class success. Unlike the more temporary wood-and-clay dwellings of poor urban dwellers, constructions of concrete offered a sense of permanence—they made a more solid claim to a future. As the price of real estate had climbed spectacularly in Mtwapa in recent years, such homes seemed like the safest kind of investment. Nonetheless, my interlocutors pointed out, such structures were themselves permeable to the moral conjunctures of their production. For Vivian and others, the image of cracked concrete houses crashing down was emblematic of a form of wealth that was itself problematic: quick money that, even if converted into tokens of durable wealth, such as houses, would not acquire the permanence that its owners desired.

In April 2011, I asked Jadini, whom I introduced in the beginning of this chapter, if he really thought that the dangers of fast money lay in the money as such. He said,

> Yes, I felt that thing myself. Because I am just fine before I enter Western Union, before I go inside. But after, I come [out], I'm like stupid. I am not able to do a budget, nothing. If I got the money like that, before I arrive at [the bar], already one thousand or two thousand [shillings] are gone. Because I meet friends: "How are you? Here, take some [money]!" Or, I meet people at the bar. [The banknotes] go away one by one. Or I run into someone else who is hungry or something. So, that's true. Everyone sees that that money is evil [*mbaya*]. I can say to myself "I won't give it out." But that is very difficult. . . . If I wake up, I go there to the ATM and take twenty thousand or thirty thousand [$250–350] and I go with it to the bar. If it finishes, I run back to the ATM and take out [more]. So, there is nothing that you can save.

According to Jadini, fast money makes people "stupid," it makes them lose their mind, leaving them unable to budget or control the pace of their consumption or the redistribution of the money. Instead of the person controlling the money, the money appears to control the person. Jadini's point—just like his earlier claim that "this money is the devil itself"—echoes Michael T. Taussig's (1980: 17) argument that, in Latin America, beliefs about money being controlled by the devil are "collective representations of a way of life losing its life," a way of speaking of "what it means to lose control over the means of production and be controlled by them." According to Jadini, such money is "evil." Even if stored in a bank, the knowledge of its presence prompts the person to return, over and over again, to the ATM, until the money is gone. Jadini's words reveal the idea of money that resists the individual's capacity to "budget" it, a practice I discuss below. They also displace agency away from apparently rational consumers who know they should budget. Many of my interlocutors used the English verb "to budget" in Swahili sentences to describe how money that resists saving and planned spending is inherently evil, cursed. Sociality also played an important role in such narratives: one usually needs others to prevent such wasteful behavior, but Mtwapa's social life was itself understood as dangerously extractive. Everybody in Mtwapa is thought to want "to extract" (*kutoanisha*) from others.

I asked Jadini what "polluted" the money. While working in northern Kenya among the families of Samburu migrants to the coast, I had heard numerous people say that money was polluted by its origin in sex and sorcery (Meiu 2017: 157–69). Jadini disagreed. "Whether you went to the witchdoctor or not," he said, "it does not matter. Whether you slept with a woman for it or she just gave it to you like that, it does not matter. You lose it just the same."

"Why is that?" I asked.

"You don't know where this money comes from. Sometimes I have to tell the white lady: 'I want this money now or I will finish it with you.' So, she starts crying, crying. That's why you cannot get any help out of this money."

The fact that the money is not "earned," given with a good heart, but extracted, Jadini suggested, might also compromise it. But he also suggested that the ambiguous origin of the money among white people is troublesome. Kenyans who seek white partners, he explained, cannot know how the latter acquired their money and why they are richer than them. "People say that the money of the whites is not bad. But then why do so many people [who obtain that money] turn mad? At the last minute, you lose everything. And you find out you have AIDS. Many people have AIDS here. They say you have to watch out for this money of the whites [*pesa ya wazungu*], because it will destroy you."

Then Jadini concluded: "You can make houses, everything. And then, the last minute, you have nothing because you did not sweat for this money." As if echoing middle-class discourses of respectable work, he framed money produced through one's own sweat as morally distinct from that produced through sex. Now, Jadini said, he hoped to meet a white woman who could take him to Europe, where he could find work and sweat for his own money. Vivian, too, found the money she made as a peer educator with NGOs more helpful than the fast riches of the sex economy. But this money was not enough to transform one's life.

Imagining Durability, Waiting for the Rush

A central preoccupation of those waiting for opportunities in coastal sex economies was imagining how an inherently problematic type of wealth could be made durable. Recall the opening of this chapter, when Jadini and Rob talked about fast money in ways that not only reproduced the fantasy of miraculous possibilities in everyday life, but also drew on a collective repertoire of known cases to devise permanence in wealth. One day in August 2008, Jadini, Saruni, another man, and I were having breakfast at a small street restaurant in Mtwapa. Saruni had been coming regularly to the coast for the past twelve years. So far, however, he had not met a European woman to help him with money. Jadini, on the other hand, had recently arrived on the coast. He had been fired from his job in Nairobi and decided to look for a white girlfriend. As we ate, Saruni gestured toward a large building across the street. It was a three-story lodge with a bar and a restaurant called Kandara. His story went somewhat like this:

> Kandara had belonged to a Kikuyu woman called Nyambura. She had migrated to the Mtwapa from upcountry as a poor, but young and beautiful woman, sometime in the late 1960s. Nyambura was a clever and enterprising woman. She went to a Swahili sorcerer and purchased a *jini* spirit. With the help of the *jini,* she soon became the secret lover of Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta. Throughout the years, Kenyatta visited her on the coast and gave her lots of money. With this money, Nyambura bought land along the main road in Mtwapa and also built the Kandara lodge and several houses. But Nyambura never married and she could not have children. Seeing that she was very rich and without offspring, she adopted and raised some street children who used to hang out at the back of her lodge. When she died, the children inherited all her wealth. In return, they buried her in a mausoleum-like grave that people in Mtwapa still marvel at when passing by her former estates.

This story hints at the complex interconnections of sex, money, and miraculous possibilities that characterized everyday life—especially waiting practices—in Mtwapa. It speaks of the high concentration of economic possibility in this town. It is a story about chance, luck, and rapidly shifting economic statuses; a story of how those who are poor today can become rich by tomorrow. While Nyambura became wealthy through her intimate relationship with Kenyatta, the street children she adopted became rich, as luck had it, because they happened to be in proximity to Nyambura at the right time. It was this proximity to the rich—to foreigners, big men, and those intimately related to them—that held life-transforming possibilities for migrants like Saruni and Jadini.

Stories like this one also had a particular appeal for the two men as they regularly returned to Mtwapa and waited to run into similarly fortunate conjunctures. Here, waiting was oriented toward the rush—its promises, pleasures, and miraculous possibilities. The fantasy of durability was central to this story: Nyambura certainly did wrong by employing sorcery to seduce the president. Long after she died, some people still spoke of "Nyambura's goats" (*mzubi wa Nyambura*) that walked up and down the town's main road causing deadly accidents: "Those are not goats," Saruni assured me, "they are Nyambura's *jini* drawing blood." Despite the ambivalence of negative forces perpetuating themselves in Nyambura's surviving wealth, men like Saruni admired Nyambura for having amassed so much power and perpetuated her lineage and name in time.

Vivian had known Nyambura personally—*Mama Nyambura,* she called her. "She only died ten or so years ago," Vivian recalled. "She was our mother, the mother of all the prostitutes. She had built a large estate and she was renting out her apartments only to prostitutes, because she knew they would pay. And she also looked out for us." Vivian knew that, like her, Nyambura had come to the coast from upcountry as a young woman and soon thereafter "entered" prostitution. But in Vivian's story, Nyambura, who could not have children, had taken a younger woman—also a sex worker—as her "wife" (traditionally, women-to-women marriages were common in East Africa) to birth in her name. The woman, who was of Kamba ethnic origin, had several children with a male lover, who was also Kamba. Later, she and this man decided to kill Nyambura. But Nymabura found out about their plans. "So, when that Kamba with her lover were getting ready to leave on a trip," Vivian said, "Nyambura told them: 'You will never come back.' They had a car accident and died." Nyambura, Vivian implied, used sorcery to kill them. But, clearly, Vivian's sympathies, like those of Saruni, lay with Nyambura. Although Nyambura had used sorcery, she did so to protect herself and her offspring. Somehow, in helping others, Nyambura succeeded in converting evil means into moral good and she made her "fast" money last. She thus secured morally positive forms of social reproduction: a lineage that continued her name and business, fame, and the recognition that came with a large cement grave attesting to her former grandeur. Indeed, everyone in Mtwapa had heard of Nyambura and the neighborhood around her former lodge is now known as Nyambura's Village.

Nyambura's story—in its various versions—played an important role in the imagining of durability *despite* the rush of an uncertain economy. And it was precisely as people waited for the rush and to find their ways into it that such stories had particular appeal. Waiting was productive in terms of the envisioning of strategies of value preservation for when the rush took over.

Waiting Out the Rush: Durability in Times of Flux

Not everybody was lucky enough to establish intimate relationships that generated substantial wealth. What is more, even those who were successful were often not able to hold on to their wealth. Vivian, who had lost her house and money after her Swiss partner left her, was convinced that the "money of sex" was the work of the devil. "This is money that it is hard to budget. You keep spending and, at the end, nothing is left." Jadini was in a similar situation. When I met him again in 2011, Jadini had had two simultaneous relationships—one with an English woman and the other with a Swiss woman. For a while, he had been doing very well. But after the women found out about each other, they left him. Jadini could no longer afford the luxurious apartment he had been renting. He moved into a simple room without water and electricity in a poor neighborhood of Mtwapa.

Learning how to wait out the rush then became an important pursuit for those involved in the sex economy. A popular saying goes, *Haraka haraka haina baraka*—"The rush, the rush brings no blessing." Indeed, as we have seen, a common perception among the Kenyan middle class is that young people lack the patience (*subira*) to work and acquire things gradually. Instead, they want to obtain things quickly. In March 2017, I heard a local police officer complain in a public speech in Mtwapa that "We have been offering training for youths to start various businesses . . . But very, very much these days, youths lack that patience to do business, to work. They only want those rushed things [*vitu vya haraka*]." But while local leaders and elders wish to inculcate patience in the acquisition of resources, many young men and women I spoke to sought better strategies to hold on to resources they acquired quickly. "Waiting out the rush" can thus mean several things. It is, first, an attempt to resist the incitement to consume or, at least, to do so excessively—indeed, it is a kind of patience. It is also an attempt to resist redistributing money to others, who would constantly ask for financial support. It is, furthermore, about preserving wealth despite the "shock" of its sudden acquisition. To some extent then, "waiting out the rush" is comparable to what Ghassan Hage (2009: 101) describes as "waiting out the crisis," or waiting to escape a situation of "stuckedness," as both efforts seek to recuperate an "ability to snatch agency in the very midst of its lack." Below I distinguish three strategies for seeking to produce durable wealth amidst the rush.



Figure 8.2. House fortified with a concrete brick fence and a large gate, Mtwapa, 2017. © George Paul Meiu.

First: enclosure. Once they found wealthy partners, men and women in sex work often moved into luxurious neighborhoods or rented, purchased, or built expensive houses. They also drove wherever they needed to go, rather than walking. These may seem like wasteful practices; at least that is how other, poorer town residents saw them. However, for those engaged in them, these practices were the opposite. They were central strategies of money preservation. Large gates, high fences, and driving rather than walking granted them more privacy. These modes of being in space and time prevented their poorer friends from seeing them and constantly demanding money. For young men, like Jadini, Rob, and Saruni, therefore, the practices of containment associated with enclave-like homes with locked gates and loose watchdogs or speedy cars with fogged-up windows (preventing acquaintances and friends from seeing that the driver has seen them but refused to stop) were not generated by a desire to be selfish and greedy. Rather, these practices constituted active attempts to defer actions and interactions that could lead to the loss of their wealth; they were attempts to literally prevent the quick flow of money. Men and women also used a sense of spatiotemporal closure to deter other people from becoming involved in their private lives, generating more gossip and envy that could prompt others to use sorcery against them or, as often happened, negatively affect their relationships with wealthy intimate patrons. Thus, young wealthy men and women tried to "stop time" through spatial closure and sustain their wealth, making money outlast the rush. Ironically perhaps, expanding wealth in time necessitated "stopping time" through concrete spatial practices that deferred intense social interaction and therewith the redistribution and depletion of wealth.

Second: the rural repatriation of capital. Another strategy I have described elsewhere (Meiu 2017) was the repatriation of capital from the coast to migrants' places of origin. Recall Rob who, upon receiving a large amount of money from a tourist, decided to board public transport and return to northern Kenya the very same day, to invest his money in cattle and kinship. Many migrants hoped that, once home, their family and kin would prevent them from spending money wastefully and guide them toward the right kinds of investments. This belief was so strongly engrained that the Samburu Moran Association, an ethnic organization that helped migrants in Mtwapa manage their finances, would only disburse their savings on the day they were returning home. To receive their savings, migrants had to show that they had already purchased a bus ticket for upcountry. To be sure, in rural areas, this money gave rise to new contestations over durability, respectability, and value. Meanwhile, on the coast, not everybody had the option of repatriating wealth. Vivian's parents in western Kenya, for example, severed their relationship with her when they saw her on national television speaking as an activist sex worker. For many other women and gay men who had run away from home, going back and investing in social ties elsewhere was not an option. So, they developed other strategies.

Third: microfinance groups. Since the 1990s, German, Dutch, American, and Kenyan NGOs in Mtwapa—many of them Christian "faith-based organizations"—initiated programs to "rescue" women (and, to a lesser extent, gay men) from sex work. These included microfinance projects meant to teach bookkeeping, accounting, time management, and other entrepreneurial skills. Small loans to start businesses (accompanied by strict repayment schedules) were intended to convince beneficiaries to abandon sex work. These NGO workers tried to discourage sex workers from participating in the speculative economy of the rush and instead sought to inculcate in them a Protestant ethic of labor, distinctly infused with the logics of budgeting, saving, and slow, gradual growth. In the ideology of such developmental reformist practices, "gambling" was in moral opposition to "working" and "budgeting." A graffiti mural along a highway in Mombasa captures this idiom quite saliently (see figure 8.3). It states: "Development: Plan the Budget" (*Maendeleo: Panga Budget*), as if to say "if you want development—that is, progress through wealth—you must learn to budget."

Development workers in Mtwapa encouraged women to open and manage their own small businesses and accumulate wealth gradually. In national development discourses, waiting in low-paying, manual jobs

Figure 8.3. Graffiti mural: "Development: plan the budget." Mombasa, Kenya, 2017. © George Paul Meiu.

in the "informal sector"—the *jua kali* or "hot sun"—figured as a middle-class ideal of work that disavows the rush and gambling as perverse. According to this logic, gambling—speculating on the rush—is the choice made by those who do not want to work and prefer "easy money." Many of these development programs have failed: as it turned out, small businesses also participated in the economy of the rush after all. "It was up and down, up and down, until you had to abandon that business," Vivian said, recalling her own trade selling plastic dishes by the roadside.

Interestingly, however, sex workers did adopt and rework the techniques of the NGOs, if not to leave sex work as such, to transform the temporal dynamics of value production in sex economies. If the money of sex was to wait out the rush, they reasoned, it had to be diverted through the channels of microfinance projects. Thus, they initiated so-called *chama* groups of twenty to twenty-five participants. These are informal accounting and lending groups that employ the logic of microfinance. Every week (sometimes twice a week), participants deposited money with an "account-keeper." Then, once every month, one member could request a loan from this common account for a particular project (e.g., children's school fees, home renovations, a life-course ceremony, etc.). While such rotating credit groups are certainly not new—indeed, they previously played an important role in colonial African cities (Shipton 2010)—in the contemporary context, people understood the role of such groups to include, among other things, an ability to tame the troubled temporalities of rushed money. The groups worked to redirect people from "gambling" to "budgeting." By rerouting money through channels of sociality and reciprocity, they sought to "rescue" it from the turbulence of the rush—indeed, to inculcate in money the waiting dispositions of durable wealth. Vivian said: "*Chamas* are very important. Without them money would not stay. You would lose it fast." Note how "rushed money" must be made to "wait out the rush." Because one type of waiting—waiting *for* the rush—is so uncertain and long, the other type—waiting *out* the rush—becomes necessary as a disciplining technique. According to this logic, if one is to emerge from the rush with some wealth, one better reroute the money of sex through the collective socialities of *chama* budgets and loans—a money laundering of sorts. As Vivian explained to me, by participating in *chamas,* men and women hoped to literally stop time and halt the exhaustive consumption of money in order to imagine how to best convert their wealth into durable goods and relations.

While those engaged in practices of enclosure, the repatriation of resources to rural homes, and/or microfinance groups hoped these strategies would prolong the durability of their savings, in reality, things were more complex. For example, while producing closure through spatial and temporal containment might indeed have been efficient in delaying, if not preventing, too quick a redistribution of money, sustaining such practices—including cars, homes with security, or lives in gated communities—required large expenditures of cash. Similarly, if the repatriation of wealth to ethnic rural areas meant investing in seemingly durable ties of kinship, in the end, relatives in economically marginal rural areas could quickly exhaust migrants' resources. More importantly, however, if these strategies of money preservation were indeed ways to cope with the contradictory temporalities of the wait and the rush, the lived experience of pursuing these strategies reproduced—albeit in different, new forms—similar contradictions. For instance, if budgeting in *chama* groups meant delaying personal expenditure because one had to wait for one's turn to spend, disbursements of money were still very much perceived as a rush. "When your turn comes and you receive the money from the *chama,*" Vivian admitted, "you must go quickly and do what you promised to do. Otherwise, if you stay with that money in your pocket, you will lose it fast." There are echoes here, once more, of the "shock" of quick money, even if it has been "laundered" through microfinancial planning. Similarly, rural areas could experience intermittent remittances of money from migrants as rushed money, money that comes suddenly and dissipates quickly.

Conclusion

New attempts to wait out the rush to prevent the depletion of wealth are themselves outcomes of a dialectic of myriad forms of rushing and waiting in Mtwapa's sex economies. Therefore, I have argued, one can only understand the temporalities of waiting relationally, in terms of their intersections with other spatiotemporal orientations, including those of the rush. These practices reveal not only that waiting is anticipatory, but also that it is relative—its meanings inscribed through the affective deployment of different temporalities and rhythms of social action.

For many young men and women from rural Kenya, coastal sex economies held the potential of radically transformed fortunes and livelihoods. Intimate relationships with foreign tourists and sometimes African elites presented unprecedented opportunities to gain wealth, build houses, buy cars, and lead independent, luxurious lives. Nevertheless, my interlocutors pointed out, "fast money" or "money of the rush" was problematic in more ways than one. This was money that would not last. It could "shock" its recipient into mindless spending and the tangible tokens of value into which it could be converted—concrete houses, for example, which are otherwise quintessential media of durable wealth—would slip away or come crashing down. As people positioned themselves to anticipate the rush of foreign capital—through rich lovers and partners—they often spoke at length about how such wealth could be tamed, made to last, and stretched out over longer periods of time. The desire to dwell as long as possible in the success of the rush led many to devise new ways to more securely store the devilish money of the rush. Whether living in enclosed compounds or driving cars to avoid redistributive requests, reorienting wealth from the coast to rural economies, or redirecting money through the socialities of communal microfinance projects, people involved in transactional sex sought to resist the temporariness of wealth as such. Even if these strategies were themselves uncertain, they offered people a sense of agency, a way to feel like they controlled money rather than being controlled by it.

The pursuit of durable value in a time of chronic temporariness brought the space-time of waiting and that of the rush into a dialectical relationship, generative of new modes of producing and storing value. But because these new modes of value preservation were themselves uncertain and remained speculative, they did not offer definitive solutions to struggles associated with the unpredictability of the rush. Instead, they amplified debates over durability and intensified the desire to find ideal modes of producing such permanence. These quests and contestations, as we have seen, enveloped vastly different media—houses, land, cars, ATMs, and grave memorials—and myriad domains of social life, including beach trade, sex work, neighborhood alliances, and relations to tourists and NGOs. The desire to wait out the rush—itself a rush against risk and speculation—was, in turn, a speculative pursuit, redefining the meaning of work, durability, budgeting, and gambling. Thus, I have argued, anthropological studies of waiting should also take into consideration the myriad temporal and spatial organizations emerging at the intersection of waiting and rushing, an intersection that has redefined the meanings of social value.

George Paul Meiu is Professor of Anthropology and Chair of the Institute of Social Anthropology at the University of Basel. His research focuses on sexuality, gender, belonging, and citizenship in Kenya. His book, *Ethno-erotic Economies: Sexuality, Money, and Belonging in Kenya* (University of Chicago Press, 2017), was awarded the 2018 Ruth Benedict Prize and the 2019 Nelson Graburn Prize by the American Anthropological Association. His work has also appeared in the *American Anthropologist, American Ethnologist, Cultural Anthropology, Ethnos, Anthropology Today,* and in edited volumes on tourism, sexuality, Africa, and the history of anthropology. He holds a PhD in Anthropology from the University of Chicago.

Note

1. Later that year, in September 2011, one British tourist would be killed and another kidnapped from the Kenyan island of Kiwayu, near Lamu, a major tourist destination.

References

Bohannan, Paul. 1955. "Some Principles of Exchange and Investment among the Tiv." *American Anthropologist*. 57: 60–70.

Blunt, Robert W. 2020. *For Money and Elders: Ritual, Sovereignty, and the Sacred in Kenya*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff. 2000. "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming." *Public Culture* 12(2): 291–343.

—. 2006. "Beasts, Banknotes and the Colour of Money in Colonial South Africa." *Archeological Dialogues* 12(2): 107–32.

Cooper, Frederick. 1987. *On the African Waterfront: Urban Disorder and the*

Transformation of Work in Colonial Mombasa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Daily Nation. 2011 "Life Is Not a Beach: Time to End the 'Easy' Money' Vicious Circle." Nairobi, 23 February.
Ferguson, James. 2006. *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Gachuhi, J. Mugo. 1973. "Anatomy of Prostitutes and Prostitution in Kenya." Working paper, University of Nairobi. Nairobi.
Hage, Ghassan. 2009. "Waiting Out the Crisis: On Stuckedness and Governmentality." In *Waiting*, ed. Ghassan Hage, 97–106. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Hansen, Karen Tranberg. 2005. "Getting Stuck in the Compound: Some Odds against Social Adulthood in Lusaka, Zambia." *Africa Today* 51(4): 3–16.
Hutchinson, Sharon E. 1996. *Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Jeffrey, Craig. 2010. *Timepass: Youth, Class, and the Politics of Waiting in India*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Kibicho, Wanjohi. 2009. *Sex Tourism in Africa: Kenya's Booming Industry. New Directions in Tourism Analysis*. Farnham, UK: Burlington.
Mahoney, Dillon. 2017. *The Art of Connection: Risk, Mobility, and the Crafting of Transparency in Coastal Kenya*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mains, Daniel. 2007. "Neoliberal Times: Progress, Boredom, and Shame among Young Men in Urban Ethiopia." *American Ethnologist* 34(4): 659–73.
Masquelier, Adeline. 2005. "The Scorpion's Sting: Youth, Marriage and the Struggle for Social Maturity in Niger." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 11: 59–83.
McIntosh, Janet. 2009. *The Edge of Islam: Power, Personhood, and Ethnoreligious Boundaries on the Kenya Coast*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Meiu, George Paul. 2015. "'Beach-Boy Elders' and 'Young Big-Men': Subverting the Temporalities of Ageing in Kenya's Ethno-Erotic Economies." *Ethnos* 80(4): 472–96.
—. 2017. *Ethno-Erotic Economies: Sexuality, Money, and Belonging in Kenya*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Morris, Rosalind C. 2008. "Rush/Panic/Rush: Speculations on the Value of Life and Death in South Africa's Age of AIDS." *Public Culture* 20(2): 199–231.
Newell, Sasha. 2012. *The Modernity Bluff: Crime, Consumption, and Citizenship in Côte d'Ivoire*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
O'Neill, Bruce. 2017. *The Space of Boredom: Homelessness in the Slowing Global Order*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Omondi, Rose Kisia. 2003. "Gender and the Political Economy of Sex Tourism in Kenya's Coastal Resorts." Working paper. Tromsø, Norway.
Osburg, John. 2013. *Anxious Wealth: Money and Morality Among China's New Rich*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Ralph, Michael. 2008. "Killing Time." *Social Text* 26: 1–29.
Schmidt, Mario. 2019. "'Almost Everybody Does It . . .': Gambling as Future-making in Western Kenya." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 13(4): 739–57.
Schoss, Johanna H. 1995. "Beach Tours and Safari Visions: Relations of Production

and the Production of 'Culture' in Malindi, Kenya." PhD dissertation. University of Chicago.
Shepherd, Gill. 1987. "Rank, Gender, and Homosexuality: Mombasa as a Key to Understanding Sexual Options." In *The Cultural Construction of Sexuality*, ed. Patricia Kaplan, 240–70. London: Tavistock Publications.
Shipley, Jesse Weaver. 2010. "Africa in Theory: A Conversation Between Jean Comaroff and Achille Mbembe." *Anthropological Quarterly* 83(3): 653–78.
Shipton, Parker. 1989. *Bitter Money: Cultural Economy and Some African Meanings of Forbidden Commodities*. Washington, DC: American Ethnological Society Monographs.
——. 2010. *Credit Between Cultures: Farmers, Financiers, and Misunderstanding in Africa*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Smith, James H. 2008. *Bewitching Development: Witchcraft and the Reinvention of Development in Neoliberal Kenya*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Standard. 2008. "Toy-Boys and Mtwapa's Property Boom," Nairobi, 28 August.
Taussig, Michael T. 1980. *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
The Star. 2018. "Nairobi Security Chiefs Destroy Over 300 Illegal Gaming Machines." www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018-10-05-nairobi-security-chiefs-destroy-over-300-illegal-gaming-machines. 5 October (accessed 15 December 2019).
Walsh, Andrew. 2003. "'Hot Money' and Daring Consumption in a Northern Malagasy Sapphire-Mining Town." *American Ethnologist* 30(2): 290–305.
Weiss, Brad. 2004. "Introduction. Contesting Futures: Past and Present." In *Producing African Futures: Ritual and Reproduction in a Neoliberal Age*, ed. Brad Weiss, 1–19. Leiden: Brill.
White, Luise. 1990. *The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Znoj, Heinzpeter. 2004. *Heterarchy and Domination in Highland Jambi: The Contest for Community in a Matrilinear Society*. New York: Kegan Paul.